

**CURBING THE DEMAND FOR SMALL ARMS  
Lessons in East Africa and The Horn of Africa**

**Nairobi, Kenya  
December 12-16, 2000**

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Sponsored by:  
Quaker United Nations Offices  
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# CURBING THE DEMAND FOR SMALL ARMS: LESSONS IN EAST AFRICA AND THE HORN OF AFRICA

## PART 1

### DURBAN TO NAIROBI: BROADENING A NETWORK AND TESTING CONCEPTS

In late 1999 the Quaker UN Offices (QUNO) invited experienced community organizers from around the world to a six-day seminar in Durban, South Africa. The intention was to test the perception that:

- a. there was active, effective work being carried out to lessen the demand for weapons in communities; and
- b. that this work was based on principles, concepts and activities that, to some degree, were common amongst all the groups, despite their apparent diversity.

The Durban session brought together representatives from 12 groups who work in nine different countries. The selection of groups mirrored the wide range of activity on demand issues. The groups came from all the major geographic regions. Some were focused on post war situations, others on inter-group conflict and still others on criminal violence. Most of the groups worked largely in urban areas, while some had national as well as local mandates. Many of the organizations represented had been created specifically in response to the problems of urban gun violence. Almost all the participants were practitioners. Their major interest was not research or academic study, although they did value these activities. They were people who faced daunting social problems and sought to apply answers in a practical, far reaching way. Perhaps most surprisingly, many of the representatives were former combatants (some former child soldiers). Whatever their background, all the participants were now committed to peace-building activity.

#### Broad Areas of Consensus

Even with all these differences, the groups reached a clear consensus on the major problems they were tackling and the factors they needed to address. The first evidence of this common understanding was the energy and enthusiasm that the participants put into their dialogue, which spilled out of the formal sessions and continued over meals and into the evenings. Several groups struck up ongoing communication and shared ideas and techniques in the months after the seminar ended. The most explicit evidence of consensus among the groups is found in the long list of lessons identified by them. The full list is found in Appendix 1 of this report. The highlights below give a clear sense of their common experience.

#### On Community Engagement:

- Most successful community programs are directed by the residents themselves. This assures practicality, relevance to local needs, ownership by residents and participation by them. The result is a greater capacity for communities to solve their own problems.
- If only certain groups are identified as problem groups, this in itself can batter self-esteem. For example, in South Africa, it has been important to bring in white youths as well as black: "It's not a problem of black or white; the problem is your behavior." In Mozambique, it has been important to use cross-class experiences to show that the problem is not just with one group; attitudes about groups, such as ex-combatants, are often based on prejudice rather than reality.
- Successful programs with poor, disaffected

teenage youth involve attractive elements such as sports, food, music and dance, along with more serious elements such as job training, job placement, educational opportunities, life-skills training, conflict resolution training and community service opportunities. Young people make dedicated, energetic program workers. In some circumstances, young people require more hands-on support and guidance.

- There is growing positive experience with the practice of involving former combatants - even those who fought each other - in peace promotion projects in post-war situations. These programs are symbolically powerful and inspiring. They assist in the reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian life and can be very effective in practical efforts to find and collect landmines and other weapons as well as to advocate and carry out conflict prevention activity. (For more comments on ex-combatants see below.)

#### On Transparency:

- Programs that elicit their focal areas from extensive dialogue within affected communities — for example through focus groups, listening projects, surveys — have stronger potential for success. A focus on human relations will have an important long-term impact.
- Decision-making structures about community programs should be open, inclusive, democratic and accountable. Resident-directed projects are more sustainable.

#### On Outside Actors:

- Work on small arms demand often requires coordination with national and local laws. Reform of policing and criminal justice systems is often an essential part of effective control of weapons demand. Legal reform is often essential, but the focus of such efforts at the national and local level must be appropriate to the context.
- Collaborative relationships between NGOs and government (national and local, such as police) could extend and sustain community work without lessening the distinctive qualities which NGOs bring to this work. Local gun “hand-in” programs require coordination and

trust between police and local populations. NGO participation is important, especially in the evolution of policies aimed at addressing the root causes of demand. However, NGOs in their relationship to government must guard against co-optation or being used simply as legitimizers of government policy.

#### On Research and Evaluation:

- For the appropriate design and implementation of programs, access to reliable national and local statistics on firearms, their use and effects is necessary.
- Integrated community anti-violence programs develop slowly. Such programs need appropriate modes of evaluation of success, particularly at the early stages of program implementation but also throughout the life of the program.

#### On Attitude and Identity:

- The goal for lessening the demand for weapons is not to remove and eliminate weapons from the community, but to render them unnecessary by a change in the community’s perception of its identity and security.
- Highly visible activities which express new relationships, new identity and new hope for change can aid community transformation.
- A community’s definition of peace or security is crucial to understanding what kinds of projects are needed.

#### On Economic Dimensions:

- Unemployment, poverty, youth alienation, involvement with drugs and other criminality are often issues linked to gun violence and declining community security. Guns exacerbate the existing levels of poverty and deprivation.
- Community activity related to lessening weapons demand often includes reconstruction, repair, maintenance and improvement of community resources, such as housing, public buildings, parks, playgrounds, clinics, etc.

#### Next Steps after Durban

At the end of the Durban seminar the participants outlined a number of ways that this rich

discussion might be continued. They asked that the organizers consider sessions in new locations where particular resources or techniques were being used. They suggested that new events might focus on specific aspects of work, such as community economic programs, gun collection, youth programming, or gun free zones. They also suggested that upcoming sessions might look more closely at cooperation between civil society and various governmental actors.

In early 2000, the QUNO staff began talks with new partners who were interested in exploring demand issues and their policy applications. Project Ploughshares, based in Waterloo, Canada, had contracted with the Canadian government to begin taking a look at the demand side of small arms issues. With extensive experience in conflict and disarmament work in the Horn of Africa, the Canadian group suggested that the next geographic focus might be in the Horn, with a particular focus on Kenya, which was clearly experiencing problems with an uncontrolled inflow of small arms. QUNO agreed with this direction. Later, the Bonn International Center for Conversion, which sponsors a regional small arms project in the Horn called SALIGAD, was added to the organizing group. The organizers wished to root the next seminar in an accurate understanding of the

region concerned. To help with this focus, they asked the Nairobi-based Africa Peace Forum to assist with the local arrangements, including those for an appropriate site visit.

By late 2000 the planning was complete. A number of seminar participants who had attended the Durban event were invited to Nairobi so that the process could include information on new and revised directions, provide continuity from one event to the next and help to develop an informal network among practitioners focused on demand issues. In addition, the particulars of the East African and Horn regions were represented by invited presenters and participants from the area. The agenda was designed to create a shared experience that would allow the participants from East Africa and the Horn to recognize the breadth of possible programs and to assess which lessons and approaches might be applicable in their situation. For the organizers, the agenda also permitted the testing of the wider applicability of the lessons identified in Durban.

On December 12, 2000, over 35 organizers and participants from nine different countries met for a five-day session at a suburban training center in Nairobi. Almost twenty of the participants represented groups based in the Horn of Africa or East Africa.

## PART 2

### THE SEMINAR IN NAIROBI, DECEMBER 12-16, 2000

#### Laying out an Agenda

The Nairobi seminar was based on the experience of the seminar one year before in Durban, but it also needed to accommodate a very different situation. For example, in Durban all the participants were experienced practitioners from mature anti-violence programs. In contrast to this, the regional participants from the Horn and East Africa included some experienced practitioners, but many others who, although familiar with the gun-violence problems in their region, had not yet initiated programs of their own.

Consequently, the agenda for the Nairobi session (listed in Appendix XX) was built around three kinds of interaction:

1. the sharing of current experience by those already engaged directly in community programs;
2. the presentation of cases (including a site visit) and background information on the situation in the Horn of Africa and East Africa;
3. a dialogue on the applicability of lessons identified at the Durban seminar, and possible new lessons from the experience in Nairobi.

#### Reviewing Changes and New Directions

The first major substantive sessions in Nairobi were seven plenary presentations by organizations from outside East Africa who had participated the year before in Durban. All the Nairobi participants had received reports from the previous year's event including general descriptions of work being done. This enabled the "outside" speakers to focus on new work undertaken in the past year and revisions to their earlier programs. This was also an opportunity to display the broad diversity of demand-side projects to the regional participants, none of whom had attended the Durban event.

The agenda alternated presentation sessions like this first one with small group discussions aimed at answering specific questions. Following the input from experienced outside organizations, the first small group session was asked to assess the continued validity of the many lessons identi-

fied in the report on the Durban event. Groups were divided into those with mostly urban and those with mostly rural experience. While there was much intense discussion, the groups returned with very consistent results. They all felt that the lessons identified three years before remained valid and were confirmed by work in the intervening period. In addition those working in the Horn and East Africa agreed that the existing lessons were quite applicable to their own situation, and should form the basis for further discussion of their situation.

#### Looking at the Horn and East Africa

The seminar then turned to an extensive series of presentations and a one-day site visit presented by organizations from within the region. These intentionally focused on rural cases, such as those of traditional pastoral groups in Ethiopia and in Kenya, and on urban community violence as seen in Nairobi. The specific features of the region, particularly its reliance on pastoral agriculture, its geographic extent and weak infrastructure, the presence of several continuing wars, the lack of border control and the presence of many ethnic and religious groupings, all became very evident to participants. Evident also were the possible resources for a response to the resulting gun violence. These included the presence of an active civil society and religious communities, the positive experience with use of traditional processes of conflict management, the interest of outside donors, and the recent expression of interest by regional governments in their Nairobi Declaration of March 2000.

The day long site visit to Garissa was a vivid expression of all of the above characteristics of the region and of its capacity to create indigenous solutions to its problems. The site was selected by the organizers to demonstrate an effective use of traditional conflict management structures to end an inter-clan conflict that had resulted in gun violence, including the use of assault rifles, deaths, injuries, dislocation of families and economic destabilization. The situation could not be corrected by the Kenyan government whose authority in the region was insuffi-

cient and largely nominal. A practical end to the violence was only possible when younger clan members, interestingly both men and women, called on their elders to begin negotiations and to end the conflict. Once this had been accomplished, the small arms which were owned by the clans (not by individuals), were called back in by the elders. While in Garissa, the seminar participants heard from the Kenyan government's Provincial Commissioner as well as from the mayor and clan elders. They also traveled to the outer edges of the town to talk with people displaced by the violence, who now were living in small camps and unable to pursue their normal livelihood.

### Assessing the Experience

The final period of the seminar centered on small group discussions to assess the particular lessons for East Africa. The participants used two draft

lists of general lessons and of lessons for east Africa and worked intently at consolidating the experience of the week. By the end of the seminar, after a full discussion in plenary, the organizers were left with a clear sense of the major new lessons for the region. (See below for the annotated list.) The seminar organizers are now collaborating on a follow-up event in Canada where these lessons will be incorporated into policy language on demand issues. This will form the basis for dialogue with governmental delegations to the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, to be held in New York, July 8-20, 2001.

Beyond these immediate lessons, the seminar also helped to consolidate a positive experience in networking on demand issues. There was a clear realization that more such sessions, focused on other regions and assessing other themes, would be very fruitful.

## PART 3:

### LESSONS FOR THE HORN OF AFRICA AND EAST AFRICA

#### A Basis in Development

The continuing experience of the participants who had attended the Durban seminar and the experience of new participants in Nairobi were the same: dealing with the root causes of the demand for guns is summed up in terms like “sustainable development” and “human security.” In Nairobi they affirmed again that their projects continue to address issues of poverty; economic development; community empowerment; inclusion of women and youth in decision making; protection of vulnerable populations; education; and opportunities for self-betterment and self-confidence.

1. Curbing demand for small arms should be done within the overall framework for community development, in which poverty alleviation and infrastructure development are done as preventive measures to eliminate reasons for a community to want arms.
2. Every community offers new challenges in the effort to curb the demand for small arms. Consequently, a thorough analysis must be undertaken to understand the cultural, anthropological, economic and political dynamics of each community for such efforts to have sustainable and binding yields.
3. Development programs, as they are being conceived, should be evaluated for their potential to cause violent conflict. Conflict prevention measures should be incorporated into overall project planning.

#### Indigenous Approaches

A new theme at the Nairobi seminar was the potential of traditional societal practices to offer effective means for resolving conflicts, collecting weapons and lessening the perceived need for small arms. The participants heard two presentations of case studies related to traditional conflict resolution practices and traditional relationships with small arms. In addition the seminar included a site visit to Garissa in northeast Kenya, where efforts to revive traditional practices had led to the ending of an inter-clan conflict and the successful collection of small arms. Many of the

points shared in these presentations and visit were entirely new to practitioners from outside Africa and they stimulated much discussion of the possible applications in other areas where traditional practices are still being used.

4. It is imperative to harness the potential offered by the indigenous methods of conflict management, taking into consideration current conditions.
5. There is a need for shared responsibilities between traditional community elders and security structures, such as formation of joint committees in working to curb demand for small arms.
6. In some traditional communities where illicit weapons are community owned, these weapons should be registered and only allowed to be held in the community under controlled conditions.

#### Actors in the Community

Recurring themes at both seminars were the need to organize demand-side programs with the community members and to base projects on their experience and expressed priorities. The reports at Nairobi reemphasized the importance of including all parts of a community as stakeholders in the process of improving security and lessening gun violence. All the reports noted the important contributions of women to successful programs. Groups with youth-focused programs, are now exploring youth-led projects.

Community members victimized by gun violence are being encouraged and supported in their organizing efforts. Most crucially, even the individuals and gangs previously associated with criminal violence are being engaged in community efforts for change.

7. Testimonies by and further interaction among relatives and families of gun victims and ex-combatants may provide strong motivation for gun control and peace promotion work.
8. Women, youth and children are powerful peace promoters and should be invited to lead and participate in programs that address conflict, violence, and the availability of guns.

9. Conflict studies should be included in school curricula.
10. All stakeholders should be included in a community dialogue on security. Even those who participate in gun violence and other criminality are essential to the process and may eventually be recruited into community programs.

## Government and Community

Government is not a neutral or necessarily benign actor in programs that affect community security. Seminar participants pointed out that corrupt behavior, and systematic violence by police and other government agents is frequently a cause of insecurity in communities. Indeed, in some cases the government police are the major threat to local populations. The creation of professional security forces with a clear responsibility to the community and its protection is often an important contribution to lessening violence and the demand for weapons. Participants also confirmed that in those cases where governments have distributed arms to militias and other civilian groups the result has been increased, chronic insecurity.

When governments want to make sustainable changes in security and gun laws, then there is ample evidence that communities are ready to play an active role in discussing proposed laws and regulations. This is only effective if there is enough time and adequate support to allow for real dialogue.

11. When reviewing and changing policy, laws and regulations on guns, governments should collaborate with civil society and targeted communities so that at implementation, the communities can feel ownership of the new legislation and will cooperate to ensure its workability. This process calls for ample time for consultation.
12. Lack of adequate public security may add to demand for weapons. Police forces can set the tone for violence or peace in a community. Systematic brutality by police and other state security or administrative agencies provides strong negative models to communities and may increase demand for weapons for self protection and counter reaction.
13. Marginalization, prejudices and stereotypes

expressed by public servants or others against a particular population may alienate a community, stimulate violence and become a reason to demand guns for protection.

14. Arming of civilian communities by government can undermine security by providing a justification for other communities, who feel threatened by those armed by the state, to seek arms to defend themselves.

## Regional Relationships

Participants in Nairobi were very aware of the many armed conflicts in border areas surrounding Kenya and other countries in the region. They emphasized the need to deal with the wider geographic aspects of any proposed security programs. Many of the problems in the region are affected by porous borders, migrating populations, related groups that span formal borders, and armed military and criminal groups which utilize these factors for their own purposes. Particularly in border and marginal areas, populations separated by geographic or other divisions must be viewed as interdependent. Programs dealing with these populations must deal with economic, cultural and conflict systems not with isolated problems.

15. In areas where communities span borders, gun laws should be harmonized and equitable development and resource sharing programs should be encouraged to ensure the security of the community and prosperity on both sides.
16. Regional cooperation between states should be strengthened and address security and small arms problems that transcend borders.

## Specific Initiatives

The many different specific activities carried out in the programs described in Durban and Nairobi have led to further thinking about how to replicate successful projects in new geographic areas. For example, participants mentioned that Cambodian ideas are being tried in South Africa and communities in the USA are benefiting from ideas originated in Latin America. At the Nairobi seminar, the South African program to initiate gun free zones was of great interest to the Kenyans present. The Kenyans also saw a positive parallel in their own country between the public destruction of illegal ivory and that of

illegal weapons. Perhaps what is most interesting is that communities which seem quite dissimilar are frequently able to share new approaches and practices. This suggests that continued networking can pay big dividends in curbing weapons demand.

17. There is an urgent need for surrendered or surplus guns held by the government to be destroyed in a transparent way. Similar to the positive experience of burning of ivory in Nairobi, which was carried out to demonstrate resolve in stamping out elephant poaching, the public destruction of weapons will demonstrate

resolve to curb demand for small arms. The immediate destruction of weapons at the point of surrender would clearly assure the community that the guns will not be reused or resold.

18 Gun free zones, when extended to particular areas such as schools, hospital or whole neighborhoods, as in the case of South Africa, should be explored as useful gun control measures in East Africa.

19. The free press should assist in public awareness of the problems associated with small arms.

## PART 4

### SUMMARIES OF PRESENTATIONS IN NAIROBI

*Presentations by participants were divided between those from outside the East Africa/Horn of Africa region, which reflected community programmes, and those from inside the region, which were based largely on current research.*

#### Presentations from Outside the East Africa and Horn of Africa Regions

The presentations were made by individuals representing organisations which had been part of the Durban seminar in 1999. They were asked to report on what had continued and what had changed in their work in the year between the two seminars. If you would like to know more about the work of these organisations, you can communicate directly with them. Contact information is listed in Appendix 3.

#### **Joseph Dube, National Organiser, Gun Free South Africa, Braamfontein, Republic of South Africa**

A major focus for Gun Free in the period immediately after Durban was helping communities in South Africa to get involved in the preparation and evolution of the national Firearms Control Bill. Since the end of apartheid, civil society organisations had not participated much in the evolution of national legislation.

Gun Free's work was an exercise in organising popular participation. The aim was to bridge the gap between the state and civil society. To help communities to make direct submissions into the legislative process, a document was developed entitled "Make your voice stop the bullet." Work had to be done with the communities in local languages and then submissions had to be translated into English. Gun Free helped groups to prepare themselves to take part in making submissions directly, a totally new experience for most involved.

Communities argued for certain elements to be included, such as laws to back up declared "gun free" zones, limits on the number of firearms to be permitted for "self defence" and on ammunition, the need for the law to be enforced and violators to be charged. Youth even argued that the

age for applying for a gun license be set at 25, although 21 was the age finally settled upon.

Because of this engagement, communities in South Africa now feel that they own this Bill, currently still making its way through the Parliamentary process. Parliament listened, communities were heard. They can see their own words in the language of the Bill. The next stage will be to see that this law works. Communities will be assisted to help in its implementation and in the monitoring of its application.

The overall approach of Gun Free is to allow the community to own its project and run it, so that, if Gun Free should disappear tomorrow, the work would continue. The engagement of young people has been particularly important. With regard to its work on gun-free zones, Gun Free incorporated ideas presented in last year's seminar from Cambodia in its work with schools, children, NGOs, and educators. In South Africa, schools and whole communities can declare themselves gun-free zones.

#### **Dominique Robinson, Middle Atlantic Region, American Friends Service Committee, Baltimore, Maryland, USA**

Baltimore is a city particularly affected by gun violence. In 1999 there were 308 homicides, or 50 for every 100,000 people, a rate ten times higher than the US average. This kind of violence is due largely to poverty. At least one in three children live in poverty. Poor communities tend to have higher homicide rates than the city as a whole. The homicide rate has dropped slightly in 2000, due mainly to more intense policing-with more people going to jail for drug-related crimes-rather than dealing with root causes. Because of poverty, local communities have become prime drug and gun trafficking areas.

Work since the Durban seminar has included looking at what the communities feel would help decrease demand for guns. This has been done largely through "listening" projects. Listening projects take a variety of shapes, some conducted as a forum, some through community surveys conducted door-to-door, some through listening to individuals heavily affected by the lack of eco-

conomic opportunity and violence.

Listening projects have indicated that economic incentives are seen to be key in reducing arms demand. Quality of life changes are also seen as necessary. Conflict resolution work is important. Our peace activities have included the “Help Increase the Peace” model and the development of curricula based around specific community needs. The “kids first” initiative has sought to pull kids together for conflict resolution work, and the “freedom school” has been fairly successful in bringing children from different parts of the city together. Because of its mixed-race make-up, the freedom school has helped to put differences between people of colour and poor whites on the table and to focus on areas of common concern.

We have also begun to work with families as victims of gun violence. This puts us in touch with people with an investment in the issue beyond just the force of law. This work especially involves women that have lost sons and partners to gun violence. It has allowed us to share information and resources, so that these women voice their concerns from the experience of having lost someone.

We are seeking to engage more intensively with volunteers and aim to bring in youth by finding funds for youth interns. We also seek to help people make links with what’s happening in Latin America, Africa and in parts of the US where concerns are similar. We try to work through coalitions, working with community-based organisations and not just social agencies. Examples of this are our work with a group focusing on police violence and work with poverty groups, trying to insert the gun violence issue into their work. We have tried to assert a Quaker presence, as many groups are ones which work with churches.

The underlying issue of creating greater economic opportunity by bringing in investment remains an important need. There have been city council initiatives, some investment has come in, but the benefits have not spread widely. There is need for a more concerted effort for people to work together in this area.

### **NEB Sinthay, Coordinator, Working Group for Weapons Reduction, Phnom Penh, Cambodia**

Our program has changed a lot since Durban. One important project area involves working in relation to government programs, for example, monitoring government actions on gun collection, demobilisation, weapons storage, etc. We write about what we see and we submit recommendations. We also work on weapons law, trying to ensure that new law fits the actual situation in Cambodia. This has involved civil society in helping to draft laws for the first time in Cambodia. One example of our work has been a national workshop on what is happening with government gun collection work and how civil society can assist, since it is often difficult to get government to prepare an action plan involving civil society.

In our public education project, we develop materials from the information we collect in order to help the population to better understand the issues. In this work we use radio and television spots as well as plays and other events designed for people who can’t read or write. In this work, we cooperate with other NGOs.

We are also involved in a network-building project. This involves meeting with different groups and organisations to explain how civil society can be involved in helping to reduce violence at the community level. This work includes provincial workshops. We also provide resources to other local NGOs in the form of materials and capacity-building assistance in order to help them to better understand the small arms issue and how they can be involved. This involves workshops using comparisons and lessons from other countries.

Some of the lessons since Durban include:

- Civil society is interested in having an input into the drafting of weapons laws, and government wants civil society input. However, if government wants such input, it needs to provide more time for civil society to work together.
- More generally, there is greater openness to working with civil society on small arms issues. There is some recognition by the government that it can not do this work on its own. Some of this recognition has also come from pressure by donor governments as well as by interna-

tional NGOs working in Cambodia.

- Our Working Group has realised that involving other groups in work on weapons laws is important, but a single group is needed to coordinate the civil society input.
- Our group has been helpful in contextualizing the draft law to the Cambodian situation. We have found examples from other places both helpful and necessary in doing this.
- Since last year, there are now a number of other groups besides us working on small arms issues. While this is good, it also creates other issues such as the problem of competition with donors for the same money. There is a need for the organizations to co-ordinate their strategy toward donors. Many governments want to help, but there is too much overlap. Projects and governments should meet and plan activity together to find the best ways of rationalising the use of resources for small arms work. Our Working Group has had a small role in working with donors to help in this rationalisation. One of the problems is that some groups tend to look at what donors want to spend money on and when they find that it is small arms, they shift to work on that topic. Another factor is that many donors and “outside” groups simply don’t know what is happening in Cambodia. Outsiders should contact the local groups to find out what is already being done and what would best suit Cambodia’s need.
- We have asked that small arms collection be integrated into demobilisation programmes, but without success so far. The World Bank, for example, is responsible for coordinating with the Cambodian government in implementing demobilisation plans, but it does not have a policy or a mandate on small arms collection. After a pilot project, we have had a small input with the World Bank to convince them and other country donors of this need. Small arms awareness and human rights training should be among the kinds of work done in preparing soldiers for demobilisation.
- There is much more engagement in Cambodia on small arms in the last year, with civil society playing a much greater role. We are not yet sure how to introduce the “weapons for development” idea, as used by the UN in Albania, to Cambodia, but we are working on it.

**Clare Hansmann Jefferson, Arms Management Program, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, South Africa**

The Institute for Security Studies (ISS) presented its broad programme on small arms in the Durban seminar. A particular feature of that seminar was a visit to the Kwa Mashu township in Durban, where participants learned of the results of an ISS survey project on attitudes toward gun problems and perceived needs. The report this year concerns the developments in the Kwa Mashu work.

ISS was interested in the difference between “organic” case study work (a project started by the community itself) and one which is stimulated from outside (as was the case with the ISS-sponsored research in Kwa Mashu) in terms of the evolution of actual community programmes in combating small arms. Such analysis is needed in terms of replicability. How do resources from outside affect to community work, including helping to get it started and its sustainability?

Growing out of the ISS survey work, which was conducted by Kwa Mashu residents themselves, an “anti-crime committee” was formed by a range of groups-political organisations, women’s, youth, and sports groups. This was done without outside help. The first phase was started just after the Durban seminar. The first step was to decide on structures, then to draw in interested parties around the firearms issues and then to define issues of concern to the community. The ISS survey was a tool for raising awareness and for the development of focus groups. A substantial rally was held on a public holiday.

Youth were particularly involved. They focused on high levels of crime, the availability of guns, poor policing and the lack of jobs. They wanted to look first at issues of concern and then at how firearms related to these. They thought through how to engage different groups, including the police and the gunmen, and tried to formulate the campaign in a non-threatening way.

Originally the thought was that people would be afraid to turn in their guns or that “gun people” would feel threatened. But different approaches were developed including mobilizing of youth, presenting alternatives to crime, making police more accessible. An umbrella group was estab-

lished with sub-committees to work on different groups.

A gun collection subcommittee was established, which made sure it had on board church people, police and other community groups. A six month implementation project was developed. Meetings were held in public to ensure transparency. Various campaigning methodologies were used to create awareness. Structures were put in place to oversee the firearms collection.

The community was not successful in getting the police and justice departments to guarantee amnesty for those handing in guns, so the decision was made to collect explosive devices-mines, mortars, ammunition. This collection, though small, demonstrated what could be done.

This programme demonstrated a number of important lessons. First, it is possible to inject the right amount of funds from outside to get things started, without unduly influencing the outcome of such work from the outside. This project also showed the importance of the group itself deciding what it wanted to do and the strength of taking a broad sector approach, especially the involvement of youth. Regular reporting back to the community was important.

Adequate structures for undertaking the work were put in place, which helped in the wise use of the funds available. The project also demonstrated the importance of having clear, realistic objectives, emphasising the things community members know how to do.

A number of indicators illustrated the success of this project: weapons and ammunition were collected; there was a good turn-out at events; a willingness to do future events was demonstrated; the project engaged difficult role players in the community, including the police; and problems were able to be dealt with as they arose.

**Salomao Tirco Mungoi, Program Officer,  
Propaz, Maputo, Mozambique**

Propaz is a project for ex-combatants, run by ex-combatants. Propaz work is focused on peace promotion. Our objective is to address the situation of the ex-combatant and things that can be done to better the image of ex-combatants in the community. Work has been going on since 1996 in helping ex-combatants to be more effective in

the community, for example through conflict resolution training, community development training, and addressing gender issues.

In doing this work, we encountered the small arms issue, for example, in our work in Mwamba district on the borders with South Africa and Swaziland where many weapons are buried. Also, weapons are used in cattle stealing and it is an area of cross-border firearms transfers. We therefore introduced small arms awareness work into our training in this district and elsewhere.

When we first suggested people should hand in weapons, it didn't work because the police wanted to know the sources of the guns. So we got in touch with the police and identified someone there to work with us. Once this happened, people began to give information as to the location of guns. To date, more than 1000 weapons have been handed in. Through this effort there has been co-operation with the South African and Mozambican police. One of the important issues with gun turn in, however, is that the weapons need to be destroyed publicly. Our work also has been made more difficult by the floods earlier in 2000.

Our work on small arms awareness and collection with ex-combatants is important. Ex-combatants know where the weapons are. Most are seen as leaders, once they make the contribution of saying where the weapons are. They then can become useful actors in community development and community mediation because they also know the damage of war and small arms.

We do our small arms collection work with a church coalition project, changing weapons into farm implements, but the success on our part is in working with the ex-combatants. We are thinking about having our own collection projects and adding gun collection to our community programmes. Feasible community arms collection programs are our aim, where weapons can be collected and destroyed so that the locals know what happens to the guns.

However, the poverty related issues still need addressing. Many ex-combatants struggle to survive economically. Surrendering arms in at the time of demobilisation usually involved only handing in one gun, when many ex-combatants

had several. So there are still a lot of guns in ex-combatants' hands, and gun violence is the result. Not only does the issue of arms collection during demobilisation have to be addressed, but the economic situation to which ex-combatants return remains critical.

In our work, we do not deal with government legislation. We think we can be more helpful at a practical level. We do the work we do with the agreement of the government. We feel that it is important to bring the police into our community meetings, in order to improve dialogue. In the rural areas, people still believe you solve problems by talking, and therefore we try to bring the police into our community visits. There has been something of a change of attitude by local populations, but there is still mistrust. This is in part because local police don't have the means to destroy collected weapons, leading to doubts as to whether collected weapons really have been taken out of circulation.

**Constance Cagombona and Ferdinand Nzohabonayo, Change Agent Peace Programme, Burundi and Ahmed Shariff, Quaker International Affairs Representative for East Africa**

The Change Agent Peace Program (CAPP), facilitated and supported by Kvekerhjelp, the Quaker service agency in Norway, supports a number of peace projects among Quaker communities in the Great Lakes region and East Africa. The CAPP project in Burundi has not been involved directly with small arms work. It has been more concerned with such issues as peace, conflict resolution, democracy, human rights and assisting women in jail and in displaced camps.

Burundi is saturated with small arms, mainly in the cities, but also the rural areas. Sources for these arms include the government and popular defense groups (government armed communities). So people have guns in their homes. Yet another source is rebel groups. Young people also are given arms to help the fight against the government. Small arms also circulate through Rwanda, Uganda and other areas in the region, including refugee camps in Tanzania. Some people are making money from trafficking in guns. Some keep guns for vengeance reasons, others for rebellion.

Little has been done by civil society to curb the proliferation of guns. We need to hold public talks and to engage the government to speak against people without authorization to have guns. As Quakers, we don't believe in having guns in our homes for security reasons. We have tried to work in other ways. For example, we have joint sewing projects between women from the Hutu and Tutsi communities, joint sports events for youth, and projects helping Hutus and Tutsis to attend school (our high school, lost in the fighting earlier, has now been able to re-open with both Hutus and Tutsis attending). Slowly we have helped to convince these people that their security lies not in having guns but in dialoguing and trusting your neighbors. We have also been working on issues of conscientious objection.

Collecting guns is necessary, but the war is still raging and such an effort would be very risky at the moment. On the political level, there is no cease fire. We don't know who will be in charge of what or what the agenda will be in the transition period. A commander of the army is not at the moment going to tell his troops to give up their arms. So we probably have to wait a while. Once the war is over, there will be a need for such a program. Otherwise, the prevalence of small arms will mean children will use them to assault their parents, people will use them when quarreling among themselves, and they will get used for stealing, since people are so poor. We can start to address those issues, but the rebels will have to be disarmed and their will need to be reductions in the government purchases of guns.

The American Friends Service Committee in its work in this region-Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda-wants to help communities to address the problem of small arms, but it is not clear just how this can be done because of the situation of violence. We want to support the communities and local groups in the region to work on this issue at the local level.

**Anton Pestana, Network for Independent Monitors, Durban, South Africa**

The Network of Independent Monitors began as a monitoring group on ongoing threat assessments. We've striven to develop an early warning capacity. We've moved on to monitoring social

violence and working to develop predictive mechanisms to lessen or prevent violence.

We too have worked in the Kwa Mashu township. This district has all the classic problems resulting from having people dumped in an unsuitable and unserved place. The township was divided between the African National Congress and the Inkatha Freedom Party in the period before the end of apartheid. Since 1994, there has been a lessening of political violence, but the area now suffers from “social decompression.” In the 80’s and 90’s it became increasingly crime ridden and impoverished. A vacuum has been created as much of the political leadership moved out and criminals moved in. With the criminals emerged a huge proliferation of gangs with guns.

We set up a project focused on criminal gangs. In Kwa Mashu we observed that, although gangs accounted for 60% of the serious crimes, they weren’t well organized. They didn’t control the drug or gun trades yet. This was an opportunity to act, before they became more organized, as in Cape Town. There are ominous signs of gang development. More visual identifiers, stronger profiles, better organization, more hard drugs, entrenchment as major economic forces in the township. A further problem is the high level of community complicity in crime in the township. The residents often have a contradictory relationship with the gangs, as victims and as purchasers of stolen goods.

Kwa Mashu has been identified as a pilot urban renewal area, with funds earmarked for development projects. There is tremendous economic potential in Kwa Mashu, a classic, apartheid era, impoverished labor reservoir. But crime militates against investment. In our work on gangs, we have found it interesting to work with different partners, including the police. We’ve sat with police and discussed ways gang consciousness develops, so that an early warning system could be developed. We’ve focused on sector policing in the township, so that more information and intelligence can be collected and response time shortened. We’re looking at setting up a community safety forum. Local police are transforming from a seriously biased force into one which can deal in a more non-partisan way with the community.

Weapons have come into the township from

state and police armories. A weapons collection program has met with only limited success so far. Some limpet mines and mortars have been turned in, but people haven’t wanted to give up their guns. They want to keep them for criminal use and for self-protection.

Membership in para-military gangs has come from those rapidly demobilized from the military units of the apartheid struggle. Because of the lack of economic opportunity, many have resorted to criminality. Other groups began as vigilante groups, organized to defend the community but soon corrupted into common criminal activity. Ex-combatants were targeted by criminals to be co-opted into gangs or targeted for elimination because they posed an obstacle to gang activities. Another cause of gang induction is social dislocation: for example, more than 50% of children are born out of wed-lock and do not know their fathers.

Presentations from the East Africa and Horn of Africa Regions

**Peter Marwa, SALIGAD, Nairobi, Kenya**

*Peter Marwa’s presentation was based on his study “An Indigenous Initiative in Curbing Demand for Small Arms: the Case of the Kuria in Kenya.”*

The Kuria, an agro-pastoralist society, live in a small area in southwest Kenya. Like the neighbouring Maasai and Kipsigis peoples, the Kuria have a strong attachment to cattle. Cattle rustling has long been an element in the lives of these peoples. In its traditional form cattle rustling did not generate serious conflict either among the Kuria or with their neighbouring communities.

This began to change, however, with the influx of small arms into the region, beginning in the 1960s. This altered the dynamics of cattle rustling in Kuria, escalating violence and causing demand for guns. Within a short time, cattle rustling, which had been a manageable, limited and in a way traditional practice, became a serious source of conflict and violence. The whole nature of cattle rustling changed from discrete raids carried out by individuals to daring, daylight ones carried out for commercial reasons,

with criminal groups becoming involved. It was no longer stealing a cow or two, but raiding, sometimes of whole herds. The weapons used moved from defensive ones to offensive ones. What was a relatively peaceful, agricultural and hardworking society became at war with itself and its neighbours.

Small arms originally came into the area from a variety of sources—from soldiers and security personnel and from people making their own, from the arming of different groups first by the Colonial Police and then by the Tribal Police; from the development of armed militias; and from the large numbers of the Kuria who served as volunteers in the Tanzania incursion into Uganda in the late 1970s and who returned with sophisticated modern weapons as well, as the skills of weapons handling and fighting. The escalation which the use of such weapons brought led to increased criminal engagement in cattle rustling as well as growing inter-clan conflict.

Research indicates that cattle rustling has been a serious problem only among four of the 28 Kuria clans, those living closest to the Maasai. Demand for small arms among the Kuria can be traced to a variety of inter-acting factors: traditional practices which glorify bravery and the knowledge of war among young males; the need to confront the cattle rustling threats from the Maasai; the arming of the Maasai in the 1970s to help them protect against cattle rustling, with guns being used later for counter raids; the failure of the Kenyan government to treat cattle rustling as a serious crime; intimidation of the police by heavily armed rustlers, which fostered views of gun wielders as heroes; the circulation of guns among cattle rustlers, giving the impression of their being many guns, leading to individuals seeking their own for personal security; clashes arising from age-old clan rivalries involving cattle raiding, that were escalated by the use of weapons; poverty, unemployment and lack of prospects for those leaving school; commercial development in cattle rustling.

Efforts to curb the demand for small arms among the Kuria came after the effects of gun violence reached unprecedented levels. Cattle rustling was reducing homes and villages to poverty as rustlers using guns drove away every

moving animal. The gun problem and cattle rustling had catapulted corruption to a level unprecedented in the history of Kuria. It began to be understood that the guns brought in and the resulting violence were benefiting only the criminal cattle rustlers, while the community as a whole suffered. It was noticed that across the border cattle rustling had been curbed. Guns had been surrendered and people were living in peace. But the cattle rustlers had fled Tanzania, and increased cattle rustling activities in Kenya could be attributed to the presence of hard-core criminals who had taken refuge in Kenya. Kenyan government approaches to curbing cattle rustling and managing the violence associated with it were perceived to be failing.

It was also noted that what had improved the situation across the border in Tanzania, in an area with a similar population mix, was revitalisation of the traditional process called “sungusungu.” “Sungusungu” is best understood as a practice which begins from a community action to identify an offence and an offender and goes on to punish by demanding compensation for wrongs done. In Tanzania, this indigenous system, which was re-introduced with the collaboration of the district administration, aimed at eliminating cattle rustling and forcing the surrender of arms from cattle rustlers and other criminals.

In Kuria, councillors, chiefs and the people in general made pleas to the government to be allowed to deal with the cattle rustlers on their own. The government, unable to effectively address the problem and the related gun proliferation in Kuria, eventually gave its approval for the Kuria to employ their traditional system. The traditional institutions, although not being actively used, had not been lost. The government permitted the revitalization of a mixture of the traditional system of “Inchama” (elders council) and the “Iritongo” (community council). The system worked in the following way. Suspects were called before the community council and interrogated. The community was able to guarantee the safety of the witness, who in several cases included parents against their own sons. The Kuria system of conviction of offenders depends on an “oath and curse” system. In this, the whole family is joined to the suspect. It is believed that if a curse does come, it can affect any member of the direct family. For this reason,

a family would not allow false oath taking. One who has information may volunteer it to save their family from the wrath of the curse.

The agreement by the Kenyan government to allow the variation of traditional practice to be introduced has resulted since 1996 in the surrendering of some 280 guns, considerable lessening of cattle rustling, peace with the Maasai, reanimation of economic activity, the reopening of schools, a slowing of the growth of poverty, and a feeling that life is returning to normal.

But the Kuria experience raises a number of ongoing issues. Whose rights and interests should prevail, the community or the individual? In the traditional Kuria practice, both the complainant and the suspect can appeal to the "Inchama." Does this satisfy currently recognised standards of due process for individuals? Why has the so-called modern legal system of Kenya failed, whereas the "sungusungu" system seems to work in curbing cattle rustling and gun violence?

In Tanzania, "sungusungu" has worked well in conjunction with modern institutions. Suspects were arrested by the "sungusungu" and held in police stations and only handed back to the Iritongo to complete the process of investigation. In Kenya, although "sungusungu" operates with government consent, there is still a rivalry between them and the police. The police often release, for lack of evidence, those handed over. The result has been that "sungusungu" has reverted to holding the suspects until the sitting of the Iritongo.

One conclusion from this experience is that the formal legal system is too elitist to be relevant in addressing the menace of cattle rustling and violent crimes involved in communal violence. It is important to create special provisions that allow indigenous institutions to handle some aspects of violent crimes. This successful example of community initiative has, however, come under criticism from human rights bodies.

**Kizito Sabala, Africa Peace Forum, Nairobi, Kenya**

*Kizito Sabala's presentation drew from his study-in-progress entitled "The Proliferation, Circulation and Misuse of Firearms in Urban*

*Centers: the Case of Nairobi, Kenya."*

The use (misuse) of small arms in Nairobi has reached crisis proportions. It is estimated that there is one illegal firearm for every 400 residents of Nairobi. There is an upsurge in gun-related crimes in Kenya, particularly in its urban centres. The proliferation of small arms into Nairobi is having serious security implications.

The sources of this growth of criminality and insecurity in Nairobi are various, but major root causes include instability and conflict in neighbouring countries, as well as poor policing of national border, which has led to large quantities of small arms finding their way into Kenya. For example, it is estimated that more than five million small arms are available in the Horn of Africa region alone as a result of the various conflicts that have wracked the area. In addition, governments in East Africa and the Horn of Africa are major suppliers of ammunition. Kenya itself has a bullet factory. But there is also a strong link between the level of poverty, unemployment and general underdevelopment and the escalating gun crimes in the county and the region at large.

Firearms find their way to Nairobi through the port of Mombassa, one of the major entry ports of illegal firearms in the country. Firearms pass through this port and on to Nairobi because of lax customs officials and the connivance of other government officials. Wilson airport in Nairobi itself is suspected of being a major entry point for illegal arms. Kenya is also a transshipment country for arms to conflicts in the region, with arms dealers and corrupt officials helping to see that some of these arms actually stay in the country. Kenya is also a transit route for heroin and cocaine to and from southern Africa, with the accompanying high possibility that arms are either used as a commodity or a facilitating tool. Illegal arms are increased also by attacks on police stations and armies, and the killing and robbing of police of their guns. Small towns and cities surrounding Nairobi also serve as transit points into the city. Another source may even be from weapons left by UN peacekeeping forces in Somalia. Kenya is home to many refugees and weapons circulating in their camps also find their way to Nairobi. Even foreign diplomatic missions may be a source of weapons in Nairobi.

In addition, the government of Kenya arms some militia groups in certain communities and there are loopholes in this practice, including the selling of arms by those legally armed by the government. Guns reach Nairobi through many routes and by a range of means. The types of weapons being used commonly in robberies, car-jackings and other crimes range from AK47s to pistols to sporting guns.

In what appears to be a collective effort to address the situation within Nairobi, the police with the support of the business community have constructed information centers within the central business district in order to respond to urgent calls. But responding quickly is not sufficient. More important is to try to tackle the root causes of the problem. Although the legacy of distrust between the police and public still exists, new opportunities for cooperation are emerging. The police are beginning to realise the importance of collaboration with civil society organisations.

One ray of hope is also the development of a more favourable regional environment for dealing with cross-border influx of arms. The governments in the region seem to have been awakened to the danger posed by small arms and light weapons and the need to seek strategies to curb their proliferation in the region. The year 2000 has seen increased government efforts to understand the problem further. A range of meetings have taken place in this region, including the gathering which produced the Nairobi Declaration and a meeting of local and international NGOs, scholars and researchers. For example, in November 2000, experts on problems of illicit small arms met in Nairobi to work out a comprehensive plan of action. There exists a growing political will which should be exploited. NGOs, experts and security officials should take advantage of the situation to develop a comprehensive, focused action plan to deal with the proliferation, circulation and misuse of firearms in the region. Within Kenya itself, one additional positive development is the emergence of the Kenya Firearms Act, which has provisions for regulating, licensing and controlling the manufacture, importation, exportation, transportation, sale, repair, storage, possession and use of firearms, ammunition, airguns and destructive devices.

The preliminary results of the research for this study suggest some important steps which need to be taken:

- It is important to intensify the spread of information to stakeholders that small arms undermine peace to a level where the public will be able to volunteer and share information with police on criminals or suspects. A well sensitised public can make a significant change, but such action by the public demands on more trustful relations between the public and the police.
- The media should be used more effectively to educate and sensitise the public about the threats posed by the availability of small arms.
- A sustained anti-small arms campaign should be initiated by civil society organisations such as the church in order to stigmatise the use of arms and to rehabilitate criminals. Models from elsewhere, such as the Mozambique churches programme on gun collection, could be borrowed, where appropriate.
- There is need for a deliberate focus by the police on gun-related crime. A speedier justice system would also help, but this requires serious constitutional changes to ensure that justice is done. A long delay between arrest and trial doesn't send a strong message to criminals about the serious intention of the authorities to stamp out the practice.
- There is need for stricter controls on the manufacture, transfer and accumulation of ammunition from Kenyan producers.
- Civil society should do more to make the public aware of the Firearms Act provisions on civilian gun possession.
- There is need to plan better for the armed/militia and vigilante groups in terms of their roles in relation to the police. Without this, there is a danger of legitimising their activities outside the legal framework. Such roles should be tightly controlled by District Commissioners, District Officers and Chiefs.
- Strict gun control measures cannot alone reduce gun-related crimes. The history of endemic conflict and the militarisation that normally accompanies it are also factors in understanding the prevalence of gun crime. A combination of poverty, unemployment, a gun

culture and the ease with which firearms can be obtained are all factors which must be tackled.

- Effective strategies to combat increasingly sophisticated crime must involve blocking illegal firearms from entering Kenya through neighbouring states. There is need for harmony among the African countries so that legal measures are adopted to enforce adherence to international regulations that prohibit weapons export to conflict-prone zones.
- There is need for greater international, regional, national, and local coordination of efforts by governments and civil society to address the problems caused by the proliferation and misuse of light weapons. It is clear that significant elements exist for a regional consensus on the nature of the problem and measures required to tackle it.

**Ayalew Gebre, University of Addis Ababa, Ethiopia**

*Ayalew Gebre's presentation was based on his paper "Conflicts over Access to Natural Resources and Institutional Mechanisms for their Resolution and Management: the Case of the Karrayu and their Neighbours." This paper draws substantially on his research for his doctoral thesis, which will be completed in the spring of 2001.*

The pastoral, agro-pastoral and cultivating groups in the Middle Awash Valley Region of Ethiopia have undergone continuous changes in their ethnic composition, territorial boundaries and processes of interaction. These changes are the result mainly of the policies promoted by successive Ethiopian governments, which have incorporated these groups into the state apparatus in order to gain greater access to and control over the resources of the region. The penetration of foreign capital into the region has had tremendous effects on traditional resource use patterns, with the biggest single impact being limited access to the natural resource base that traditional groups had freely utilised in the past. The resulting fierce competition for the remaining scarce forage and water has greatly affected the interaction of the groups and profoundly changed the nature of inter-ethnic relationships, bringing the groups into a spiral of inter-ethnic conflicts. Large-scale mechanised farming and

crop cultivation have also contributed to the deterioration of the ecology of the region.

The various nomadic pastoral groups inhabiting the Awash flood plain have frequently clashed with one another over the best grazing lands and water points due to their heavy dependence on cattle and herds for their livelihood. Hostilities between the nomadic pastoral groups in the region are aggravated by the expansion of large-scale irrigated agriculture and an extensive network of conservation areas for game/tourist parks. There has been a consequent inflow of firearms into the region. The Awash Valley area has become something of an arms bartering centre.

Clashes among the different groups in the area, as they encroached on one another's traditional areas, have led to heavy loss of life, especially in recent years due to firearms proliferation. Weapons have entered the region through smugglers as well as demobilised soldiers selling their weapons. In addition, many of the army training grounds are in this area and there was heavy upheaval in the area in the early 1990s.

The Karrayu, indigenous inhabitants of the Metehara Plain and Mount Fentale area, are Oromo-speaking, transhumant pastoralists. The stress on the area has meant that the Karrayu have come into conflict with other peoples of the region such as the Arsi Oromo, the Afar, the Argoba, and even with their traditional friends the Ittu as resources have become scarcer and the Ittu occupied more and more of Karrayu land.

A major misunderstanding and confrontation took place between these two groups in 1996 over the use by the Ittu of a traditional Karrayu ritual site for cultivation. The confrontation escalated until it seemed that open warfare was about to break out. Neither the elders of the groups nor local government officials were successful in resolving the disputes. Eventually, it was the involvement of neutral elders from the Arsi Oromo, who arbitrated between the two sides, that brought about a relative peace between the clans. This case is illustrative of the competitive and antagonistic nature of the issue involving pressure on land and scarce grazing resources. It is so sensitive and delicate that tensions and hostilities are prone to crop up even between historically friendly groups.

For such inter-ethnic conflicts, the Karrayu had a long-running institutional mechanism meant to settle such problems or prevent their further escalation. This traditional institution is known as "Arrarra," which refers to the body of peacemakers called Jarssota Arrarra, drawn from senior community elders as well as former or incumbent Gada (elected leaders) and ritual leaders. It also refers to the actual process of reconciliation and the peacemaking ceremony. Members of the peace-making body, the Jarssota Arrarra, act in this capacity for as long as they are alive and as such constitute the traditional conflict redressing institution, in the Karrayu Gada system.

When conflict arises between the Karrayu and some other neighbouring group, one of the parties involved usually initiates the process of reconciliation. Messengers from one party, in consultation with the elders of the other side in the conflict, arrange for a date on which the two parties actually come together to hold a peacemaking ceremony. Usually the ceremony takes place exactly at the site where the conflict started, which quite often happens to be a grazing ground or watering point. The Jarssota Arrarra and their counterparts from the conflicting party sit together to talk about the misunderstandings and what should be done to redress them. Both parties reach a common agreement that neither of them benefits if the conflict escalates and the government has to intervene. Hence, they decide to resolve the case between themselves on the basis of their cultural beliefs and practices. The values of mutual trust firmly rooted in oath-taking rituals lay down the corner stone for an enduring process of reconciliation and peaceful coexistence. As a show of mutual commitment, each side makes a pledge to remain loyal to the other concerning its terms of oath. Guilty individuals are pinpointed and the wronged party compensated, depending on the extent of the human and livestock losses suffered.

In the final phase of the peacemaking process, representatives of the groups involved let the government authorities know of the reconciliation, thus confirming that justice has been done with the guilty side penalised, blood prices paid for victims, lost livestock retrieved and peaceful relations restored. With this knowledge, government officials are asked to accept the agreement and quit pursuing the case.

In one such reconciliation ceremony witnessed by Ayalew Gebre, the parties sat in a special building in a north, south and west pattern. They moved eastward, the symbol of peace. Sticks were exchanged as symbols of peace. There was a symbolic breaking of spears and the blunting of tips. These were then taken out and soil thrown on them, as if burying them. This was then followed by a communal feast. This ritual has had an important and relevant symbolic significance in the reduction of the demand for weapons in the area.

Karrayu elders believe Arrarra is effective and durable in a situation where the damage done to the groups is more or less proportionate, and that the chances of reconciliation are slim where one side appears to have inflicted a higher degree of losses on the other. Thus, timing becomes important when a conflicting party contemplates a peace initiative by means of the Arrarra institution.

In earlier times, peace and reconciliation restored through Arrarra used to last long and, hence, proved effective. The practice exerted considerable force on the communities concerned. For the elders, the strong bonds of mutual trust and the spiritual values associated with it and deeply embedded in the psychology of the adherents explain the enduring effects of the process. The ceremonial oaths also had special powers by virtue of the fact that they were generally and unquestioningly believed to be binding on everyone involved. In addition to these deterrents, the transparency with which the Arrarra process takes place acts as a strong factor in ensuring that the peace vows continue to hold.

However, with the passage of time and interference with the practice by government authorities, the Arrarra institution gradually became undermined and lost some of the effectiveness that it had once enjoyed. Increased involvement by authorities, including installing their own representatives, deeply affected the trust and openness characteristic of the practice and undermined confidence in it. This weakening of the traditional conflict resolution practices has resulted in offenders seeming to gain from the conflicts caused deliberately or otherwise. As a result of this, incidents continue to multiply and spread throughout the region, making it vulnerable to

recurrent armed clashes between various pastoral and agro-pastoral groups. Thus, instability prevails at the moment to a degree higher than it did in preceding years when the traditional Arrarra practices were stronger.

Ayalew Gebre then illustrated a case not covered in his paper to show how these traditional practices, coupled with formal methods by the government, can have a positive impact on violence reduction. Two powerful groups in terms of firearms inhabit three of the five countries of the Horn of Africa. The major failure of government before 1991 was in not making use of traditional peacemaking practices and including the people of the area in settlement efforts. Since 1991, there has been an attempt to disarm the groups, but borders are porous. The government sought

to make areas off-limits to some people in an effort to keep the arms brokers out. The militia was brought in to do this. What began to have a positive effect, however, was a meeting in 1998 which ended in the formation of Joint Peace Committees, including representatives of the government, law enforcement, local people, whose engagement was actively sought, and others. Since then, the relationship between these two groups has significantly improved because the government is wisely combining both formal and traditional forms. In addition, the two groups were made to be involved in a joint development project, a water project ensuring equal access for both groups. The introduction of such joint development schemes injects new hope for cooperation.

## GARISSA EXPOSURE TRIP

On the third day of the seminar, December 14, the seminar group flew in two small planes from Wilson Airport in Nairobi to Garissa, about 90 minutes flying time away. Garissa is located in the North Eastern Province, the third largest province in Kenya, covering an area of 126,624 sq. km. This day exposure trip was organized by the seminar partner organizations in conjunction with the Pastoralist Peace and Development Initiative (PPDI), a Garissa-based NGO which has worked to seek long-lasting solutions to security problems in Garissa district. The day was itself a witness to the collaborative work being undertaken in the Garissa district to reduce small arms demand, with the program featuring Kenya government representatives, representatives from local clans, and PPDI. The written briefing that participants received is included as Appendix . This briefing provides a useful background on the local setting and the initiatives which have been undertaken to reduce violence in the Garissa district. But the day itself provided additional information and a rich exchange of views, a summary of which is provided here.

### Kenya Government Initiatives

Seminar participants first visited the offices of the Provincial Commissioner, Mr. S.M. Makhanu. Following a welcome, they then went to the District Police Station, where they viewed weapons which have been collected or confiscated. It was explained that many of the weapons collected in the area are automatic and most not of a type used officially in Kenya, indicating that they have come from elsewhere. The local police also explained that there are periods when locals are allowed to turn in weapons without penalty. Any weapons which are collected or confiscated are registered and eventually shipped to the Central Firearms Armory in Nairobi where a decision is made about what to do with it. The police emphasized that the care which they took in stockpiling the weapons and the transparency with which they did this was important. One local person commented to members of the group, however, that this process was slow and the fact that the guns were not destroyed locally

in a visible fashion reduced the programs effectiveness. The day conference then began at a near-by facility.

In his presentation, the Provincial Commissioner linked the efforts being undertaken on the ground in Garissa district to reduce small arms to the global issue of small arms and light weapons, particularly the need to regulate the international trade in these weapons. Clan wars in the district and the sheer numbers of guns have badly affected the area, with development being regulated to the side.

The North East Province shares a 700 km border with Somalia and a 300 km border with Ethiopia. The region is largely semi-arid with low rainfall and a harsh natural environment. The population of the area, approximately one million, is made up of Somali clans. The history of the area is one not only one of famine, disease, drought and flood, but also of clashes between and within these clans. Under the colonial administration, the area was a closed administrative area. At independence, the Somali leadership opted to join the Republic of Somalia, which resulted in an unsuccessful war of secession. This war was the first time small arms were introduced into the area on a large scale. And the trend has worsened since.

To quote the Provincial Commissioner, "Alarmed by the high demand for small arms by local clan-based populations, the government has put in place a series of measures with the aim of reducing possession of illegal firearms. . . . [T]hese government efforts have been frustrated by the negative attitude of local leadership, which is based on the endemic mistrust among the clans and the lack of confidence in the ability of the government to adequately protect them and their property."

Efforts by the government to address small arms demand have included working with elders in efforts at conflict resolution, putting into place traditional-based sanctions against offending parties. Such "communal punishment" is having a positive effect. The government has also introduced amnesties for the voluntary surrender of firearms. This has met with limited success. The

more firearms that are surrendered, the more new ones are acquired. The government representatives also hold meetings with community leaders where they “preach peace” and encourage the surrender of illegally held firearms. The government has also begun to appoint armed and trained Kenya police reserves (KPRs) from the community itself, to assist in the creation of a sense of security within the community. Finally, the government has been mounting security operations to recover illegally held weapons, but these are very unpopular with the local leadership and have come under attack from police reservists.

The Provincial Commissioner cited some statistics to show how the number of banditry incidents, killings, and robberies increased between 1994 and 1998. The government believes that almost every family in the North Eastern Province has a gun in good working order and that most of the major clans in the area have clan militias. It is also believed that each elder, religious leader, and political leader knows where the guns are and who owns them. It is recommended that: (1) these leaders be made accountable in the gun reduction campaign; (2) all guns be registered and left under the ownership of the holders; (3) the number of KPRs be increased; (4) there be adequately funded “change-of-heart-and-attitude” campaigns, through seminars and workshops for community leaders; (5) gun ownership laws in neighboring countries be reviewed by the international community and efforts made to harmonize these laws; (6) the international trade in small arms be regulated to minimize the conflicts particularly in the developing world, the lack of which undermines local efforts; and (7) more development resources be made available in the region to improve infrastructure (e.g., roads, so that the security forces can move more effectively), agriculture and basic services.

In response to a question about what has been most effective in developing community support, the Provincial Commissioner noted that a number of “sensitizing seminars” had been held for provincial leaders. Elders have been encouraged to go back to their traditions for resolving conflicts. This has helped certain clans to withdraw from conflict, although others are not yet fully committed. More education of clan leadership is necessary if the recovery of firearms is to be

more successful. It has also been directed that every district should have a peace and reconciliation committee. Such a committee exists at the provincial level as well.

In the past, the government always responded to clan conflict with force. This caused a great drain on resources and paramilitaries had to be used. The return to a system based on communal punishment makes the whole clan punishable if someone kills someone. It is hoped that this system, if it is based on the wish of the people themselves, will be put on a legal basis through national legislation.

Many of the guns in the region poured in after the collapse of the Barre regime in Somalia, when some 127,000 refugees poured into the district. Because of the closeness of the Somalia border, there is a great deal of back and forth and a market for guns has developed in Kenya. Firearms come in on lorries and other means and flow through the region on to Nairobi. Firearms also come in from Ethiopia.

In addition to the clan clashes, the firearms problem is also fueled by economic banditry in the area. Banditry tends to be confined to the areas around the refugee camps. The government now has permission to enter the camps to mop-up illegal weapons.

In response to a question about how poverty in the province may be related to small arms demand, the Provincial Commissioner noted that the previous emphasis on security had meant that too little attention had been able to be given to development. “Our bit of the national cake in this province has been to spend it on security.” One of the reasons for looking at traditional conflict resolution methods has been the recognition of the need to shift priorities from security to development.

The Garissa District Police Commissioner noted how important the work with PPDI had been in helping to get the people themselves to address security issues. “Once you have the local people addressing the arms issue, it yields results.” He noted that women had been very involved in this whole issue. It was important to engage women in saying “no” to small arms, as women were being used to bring small arms in, since they can’t be searched. Many more women are being

recruited into the police, in part to make searches possible.

### Pastoralist Peace and Development Initiative

The group was then addressed by the Mayor of Garissa, who himself is a “patron” of PPDI. He gave factual information on PPDI and he and other members of PPDI responded to questions from the group.

PPDI, a community-based organization, was established by local leaders and youth groups in 1998 with the objective of understanding the origins and dynamics of the conflicts in the region. It has aimed at promoting traditional methods of conflict resolution and peacemaking.

It was noted that raiding and banditry have both contributed to underdevelopment, but that poverty and access to resources and grazing land has contributed to the conflicts in the region, which themselves are linked to the struggle for political, social and economic power. The occurrence of violent conflict has diverted resources and energy from the daily struggle for survival. Increasing resources would contribute to the drying up of small arms.

The Garissa area community had traditional ways of governance. The national court system is not effective and there is a vacuum. PPDI is trying to re-build the traditional methods of conflict resolution and calls for traditional and national methods to be harmonized. “Kenyan law, born of Britain, has nothing to do with the lifestyles and cultures of this land.” The British system left the Somali people to use their traditional systems. The Kenyan government wanted to incor-

porate the area into the national system. It used the “emergency law” to terrorize the people. But the people refused to be bound by this. They feel that the national law is not their law.

PPDI met many challenges in seeking to revive traditional methods of conflict handling. These were forgotten institutions no longer respected by communities or the government. Traditionally the “Council of Elders” was well-respected. The Government is now recognizing the Council of Elders efforts. Under this method, cases involving crimes committed by Somalis are handed back to the clans, with the elders doing the follow-up. As the revival of this method in Wajir district has shown, involving all the stakeholders has proven to be the best method of solving conflict among the clans at the moment. One dimension of this is that a settlement involves “blood money” being paid to the affected family, as a tool for calming down conflict and reducing revenge attacks. The strengthening of the traditional methods also means that elders are better able to convince bandits in the bush to surrender their firearms.

PPDI seeks to be a way of bridging the gap between the communities and the government, which was formerly seen as the enemy. At present, PPDI has about 120 members, many of whom are women, including women as board members. PPDI is made up of people from the different clans. So far, PPDI is not part of the District Security Committee, but, when there is a problem, there are elders who represent each clan on security issues and who are regularly consulted. It was noted, however, that thus far the government’s District Security Committee is non-local in membership.

## APPENDIX 1

### LESSONS LEARNED: DURBAN SEMINAR, NOVEMBER 19-24, 1999

The following is a list of the main lessons identified at the first international seminar on lessening the demand for small arms. These lessons were re-affirmed by the participants of the second seminar in Nairobi. For a full report on the Durban seminar, see “Shrinking Small Arms: A Seminar on Lessening the Demand for Weapons, Durban South Africa, November 19-24, 1999,” Quaker United Nations Offices, New York and Geneva, 2000.

#### Engaging the Community

On “community empowerment”

- Most successful community programmes are directed by the residents themselves. This assures practicality, relevance to local needs, ownership by residents and participation by them. The result is a greater community capacity to solve its own problems.
- Communities need to say what they need, and community resources need to be used to the extent possible in providing for these needs. Key to successful community programmes are activities that emphasise “bottom-up” problem solving — for example, community-based justice programmes that bring perpetrator and victim together; conflict resolution training for community residents and other civic ways of problem-solving; leadership development training.
- Outside intervention should be based on local needs. These should be ascertained via dialogue. External actors do have an important role to play in passing on expertise, but local people know their setting. The principle should be “outsiders” and “insiders” learning from each other.
- Programmes should meet individual training needs as well as community needs, for example, activities for ex-combatants or other specific groups in the community.

On “engaging different sectors of the community”

- Identify key actors in the community, such as indigenous groups, churches, ex-combatants. This will be different for different settings.
- Successful community programmes are often

also directed at specific groupings, their needs and what they can contribute, for example, youth, women.

- In some communities, the church/temple/pagoda can be a keen partner in programmes such as conflict resolution, economic development, facilitation of community problem-solving, working with NGOs.
- It is important to encourage wide-spread participation and to seek to build partnerships within civil society generally. Activities that bridge community differences or re-connect alienated communities are often used.
- Don’t avoid the more difficult groups, for example, males. There is a strong link between perceptions of masculinity and firearms usage.
- If only certain groups are identified as problem groups, this in itself can batter self-esteem. For example, in South Africa, it has been important to bring in white youths as well as black: “It’s not a problem of black or white; the problem is your behaviour.” In Mozambique, it has been important to use cross-class experiences to show that the problem is not just with one group; attitudes about groups, such as ex-combatants, are often based on prejudice rather than reality.
- Developing networks of groups (e.g., human rights, development and justice) can be important because they bring in a greater range of experiences and can provide a bigger voice.
- Successful programmes with poor, disaffected teenage youth involve attractive elements such as sports, food, music and dance, along with more serious elements such as job training, job placement, educational opportunities, life-skills training, conflict resolution training and community service opportunities. Young people make dedicated, energetic programme workers. In some circumstances, young people require more hands-on support and guidance.
- There is growing positive experience with the practice of involving former combatants - even those who fought each other - in peace promotion projects in post-war situations. These programmes are symbolically powerful and inspiring. They assist in the reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian life and can be very effective.

tive in practical efforts to find and collect landmines and other weapons and to advocate and carry out conflict prevention activity. (For more comments on ex-combatants, see below.)

On “transparency” and “sustainability”

- Programmes that elicit their focal areas from extensive dialogue within affected communities - for example, through focus groups, listening projects, surveys - have stronger potential for success. A focus on human relations will have an important long-term impact.
- Decision-making structures about community programmes should be open, inclusive, democratic and accountable. Resident-directed projects are more sustainable.
- Successful programmes will take fully into account local history and realities. For example, the needs of communities where social structures and lines of social integration have disintegrated will be very different from settings where these can still be seen to be intact.
- It is important to locate the project in a larger social framework and with wider strategic objectives.
- It is important in the development of local projects to do it with an awareness of local power structures and to try to build relations between the community and legitimate structures. An understanding of how particular projects might be perceived in relation to local power relationships — including their possible perception as threats — is also necessary.
- Greater awareness must be created at the local level of what is happening elsewhere, including at the international level.
- Invest in the community at the local level, even if there is war at the national level.

Relating to External Actors

- Work on small arms demand often requires co-ordination with national and local laws. Reform of policing and criminal justice systems is often an essential part of an effective control of weapons demand. Legal reform is often essential, but the focus of such efforts at the national and local level must be appropriate to the context.
- The impact of the law, of course, depends on

how effectively the law is enforced. Often laws are not well enforced simply because local police/customs officers/border guards are ill-informed about the law. Therefore training and education are required. In other cases, corruption and abuse by officials actually work to fuel demand for arms.

- Community police and “restorative justice” programmes can often be effective approaches to arms demand reduction.
- At this stage of development, “international law” is perceived to have little impact on local situations. However, regional initiatives can be important influences on what goes on domestically in different national contexts.
- Celebrities are often useful as symbolic figures to legitimise and publicise community initiatives. However, the use of celebrities has to be appropriate to the local setting. A good example is the work of football star Pelé with poor youth in Rio de Janeiro. In some settings where national consensus is limited and violence has been great, such as Burundi, the use of celebrities will be less effective. Radio in many settings is still a highly useful medium for getting messages across to the public.
- NGOs may play an effective part in linking community programmes, national governments and the international community. This may assist co-ordination, amplify advocacy and aid the dissemination of research. Communication and co-operation between NGOs operating at the community and international levels is therefore important.
- Collaborative relationships between NGOs and government (national and local, such as police) could extend and sustain community work without lessening the distinctive qualities that NGOs bring to this work. Local gun “hand-in” programmes require co-ordination and trust between police and local populations. NGO participation is important, especially in the evolution of policies aimed at addressing the root causes of demand. However, NGOs in their relationship to government must guard against co-optation or being used simply as legitimisers of government policy.
- Arms demand work could be more effective if it were incorporated into the programmes of existing NGOs with wider mandates, such as

humanitarian, human rights and development organisations. Firearms movements need to be more creatively linked, for example, with campaigns related to drugs, crime and illegal trade in natural resources.

- At crucial times, solidarity actions by outside organisations and individuals can help a local initiative to succeed. Highly publicised examples from other settings can be an important positive influence for local initiatives. Exchanges can also be useful, although funding is often a problem.
- NGOs are not homogeneous. The role of outside NGOs acting in local settings is not necessarily positive. Outside NGOs must evaluate their attitudes and approaches when intervening in local settings.

### The Importance of Research and Specialised Research Methodology

On “research”

- For the appropriate design and implementation of programmes, access to reliable national and local statistics on firearms, their use and effects is necessary.
- Integrated community anti-violence programmes develop slowly. Such programmes need appropriate modes of evaluation of success, particularly at the early stages of programme implementation but also throughout the life of the programme.
- It is important to link research organisations to organisations doing work on the ground.
- More extensive sharing of survey results, practical experiences, effective advocacy and relevant national laws would assist most weapons demand programmes.

On “lessons from practice”

- Many successful weapon demand projects are forms of community development, rather than criminal justice or arms control work. Successful projects require a comprehensive set of related initiatives, but the particular emphasis will depend on the situation.
- Gun collection programmes have a highly variable record of success. They must be carefully planned, monitored and verified if they are to

have practical value and not produce negative side effects. The success of gun collection programmes depends on the degree of confidence and security people feel in the programme.

- Gun collection programmes should focus on rewarding the community, rather than the individual.
- It cannot be emphasised too much that all collected weapons must be destroyed - visibly and publicly - if a collection programme is to have a positive, long-lasting effect. Cheap and efficient gun destruction technology exists and efforts should be made to spread its availability.
- Successful community programmes make wide and sophisticated use of highly visual public education tools, which use carefully designed language and materials for the specific audience being targeted.
- Most demand projects involve some focus on change of identity and basic assumptions by participants. For this and other reasons, the process is often long and shows few results in the first years. Patience is required on the part of programme facilitators and their funders.
- Working with weapons issues in the midst of communities in conflict often involves risks to individuals. Programmes need to be designed carefully so as to protect the security of those involved.

### Compelling Economics

- Unemployment, poverty, youth alienation, involvement with drugs and other criminality are often issues linked to gun violence and declining community security. Guns exacerbate the existing levels of poverty and deprivation.
- Community activity related to lessening weapons demand often includes reconstruction, repair, maintenance and improvement of community resources, such as housing, public buildings, parks, playgrounds, clinics, etc.
- There is a need to assess the economic impact of gun violence on communities, e.g., in terms of medical expenses, the privatisation of security, police/prisons, drug activity. Violence sucks economic activity away from communities; investment stays away.
- For some settings, the notion that guns are a

by-product of economic injustice needs to be developed.

- The links between domestic gun proliferation and international weapons flows need to be understood in domestic gun control programmes.
- As we work on gun violence, we need to develop positive alternatives for youth, not only in terms of economic opportunity but also in terms of the positive dimensions of what gangs often offer - identity, purpose, group support, security.
- Often a shadow side of the military/security/justice institutions is revealed in their involvement in drugs and gun dealing.

### Identity and Attitudes

- The goal for lessening the demand for weapons is not to remove and eliminate weapons from the community, but to render them unnecessary by a change in the community's perception of its identity and security.
- Highly visible activities, which express new relationships, new identity and new hope for change, can aid community transformation.
- The community's definition of peace or security is crucial to understanding what kinds of projects are needed.
- A challenge is to learn how to incorporate race, culture and gender perspectives in education programmes.
- Although culture is not static, existing norms, values, beliefs, national or group experience, and social practices need to be understood and incorporated as starting points in programmes. When we look at a situation or enter a community, we must be aware of why things work the way they do. We have to understand and make use of the cultural dimensions, if we expect to encourage a change in values and to assist new norms to emerge.

Strategies that can be used to transform societal attitudes include:

- Programmes targeting women, which help create the conditions for women to participate and raise self-esteem in women, because the role of educated, economically empowered women is vital for social change.

- For some issues, it is necessary to target specific social sectors, such as older people/elders. For example, in traditional cultures, conflict resolution requires the engagement of the older people, because they will be listened to.
- Young people are more likely quicker to change their attitudes to violence and investment in education is crucial to encouraging this process to occur.
- Programs that enable men to play constructive roles in anti-violence projects challenge some of the underlying structural causes of community violence. The prominent involvement of former combatants, mostly male, in peace promotion activities has been effective in changing community attitudes toward violence.

### Focusing on the Positive Potential of Ex-combatants

- Ex-combatants from opposing sides face similar problems. This similarity should be recognised, as such recognition represents a positive factor for reconciliation. Ex-combatants from whatever side, being in the same situation, will come together. Their capability to do this should be recognised.
- Ex-combatants have positive qualities such as discipline and organisational skills that can contribute to the success of programmes, e.g., mine clearance and locating arms caches.
- Reintegration programmes for ex-combatants must include not only demobilisation and disarmament, but also development and democracy. Programmes that have only the first two are likely to be failures.
- Programmes aimed at ex-combatants should look at training and not just at "pay-outs." This will promote sustainable re-integration. Ex-combatants can play positive roles for the implementation of practical projects in the community. Ex-combatants should be consulted to identify needs. Programmes for ex-combatants should aim to provide training in skills relevant to their communities. Training should be aimed at promoting sustainability and integrated development.
- Disabled ex-combatants have special training needs.

## APPENDIX II PROGRAMME

### **Monday, December 11, 2000**

All day:

Arrival of overseas participants

Meet and greet participants

Take participants to AFC

### **Tuesday, December 12, 2000**

Further arrivals of participants and transport to AFC

Registration of participants at AFC

10h Planning session for local and overseas organizers AFC

15h - 17h Opening Session (Plenary room)

Welcome Address

Vision for the Seminar

Brief Welcoming by Sponsoring Organizations

Participants introduction and their relation to the topic

Agenda Review

Logistical Information

Speakers/Moderator:

Sec-Gen. of All Africa Conference of Churches

Amb. B. Kiplagat

David Atwood, Quaker United Nations Office, Geneva

Amb. O. Adala

19h - 20h Dinner (Dining room)

Informal sharing of expectations and hopes

### **Wednesday, December 13, 2000**

AFC

8h30 - 9h

Registration of additional participants

Morning:

Presentations from Groups outside the region dealing with Small Arms control

Discussion and analysis

(20 minute presentations and clarifications) (Plenary room)

9h - 9h30 Gun Free South Africa

9h30 - 10h American Friends Service Committee/Middle Atlantic/USA

10h - 10h30 Working Group on Weapons Reduction/Cambodia

10h30 - 11h Break

11h - 11h30 Arms Management Project, Institute for Security Studies, South Africa

11h30 - 12h Propaz/Mozambique

12h - 12h30 Change Agent Peace Prog. (CAPP)/East Africa & Great Lakes

12h30 - 14h Lunch Dining room

Afternoon:

14h - 16h Lessons Learned Session (Committee rooms)

Urban and rural Working Groups, based on the morning presentations

Group work with the aim to draw lessons and to develop preliminary policy recommendations

16h - 16h30 Break

16h30 - 18h Report back to the plenary (Plenary room)

Presentations by the Working Groups and plenary discussion

18h30 - 20h30 Dinner (Carnivore Restaurant)

### **Thursday, December 14, 2000**

Exposure Trip Garissa town, North Eastern Province, Kenya

One hour flight, 600km NE of Nairobi

7h Departures

Meeting with local elders

Presentation and Q&A session

Meeting with local government officials

Presentation and Q&A session

Exhibition of guns surrendered

Wrap-up session by PPD

Observations/conclusions on the day

Return to Nairobi

18h - 20h30 Dinner (Bomas of Kenya)  
Followed by traditional Kenyan tribal dancing

**Friday, December 15, 2000**

Morning:

Presentations from Groups from the Horn of Africa and East Africa regions dealing with Small Arms control (20 minute presentations and clarifications) (Plenary room)

9h - 9h30

Basil Nyama, Life and Peace Institute

9h30 - 10h Urban gun-related violence, the problem in Nairobi

Kizito Sabala, APFO

10h - 10h30 Break

10h30 - 11h Conflict Resolution, Management, Institutions the Case of Pastoral Karrayu and their Neighbours in the Awash Valley of Ethiopia

Dr. Alayew Gebre, OSSREA

11h - 11h30 Kuria, Kenya, an indigenous approach to small arms control and law enforcement

Col. Peter Marwa, SALIGAD

11h30 - 12h30 Robert Muggah, Small Arms Survey, Geneva; followed by Anton Pestana, Network of Independent Monitors, Durban, South Africa

12h30 - 14h Lunch Dining room

Afternoon:

14h -16h Lessons Learned Session (Committee rooms)

Urban and rural Working Groups, based on the morning presentations

Group work with the aim to draw lessons and to develop preliminary policy recommendations

16h - 16h30 Break

16h30 - 18h Report back to the plenary (Plenary room)

Presentations by the Working Groups and plenary discussion

Identification of draft themes and conclusions for Saturday group work; planning for Saturday public event

18h30 - 20h30 Dinner (Dining room)

Individual Contacts/talks amongst the participants (Common areas/bar)

## **Saturday, December 16, 2000**

9h - 9h15 Plenary session: overview of the day; aims for morning session

9h15-1030 Small groups meet to elaborate and refine early conclusions (Committee rooms)

10h30 - 10h45 break

1045 - 12.30 Plenary discussion on consolidation of ideas/preparation for afternoon presentations/ideas for follow-up seminars (Plenary room)

12h30 - 13h30 Lunch (Dining room)

13h30 - 14h45 Global Action: the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) and the 2001 UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms in all its aspects (Auditorium)

15h-17h

Public Event (for Press, Government, and local NGO community) (auditorium)

Presentations on "Curbing small arms demand: Central lessons"

Durban Seminar Report

Rural Project Report

Urban Project Report

18h30-19h30 Dinner (Dining room)

Social time and farewells (Common areas/bar)

Departures of some participants

## **Sunday, December 17, 2000**

Departures of all participants

10h Evaluation meeting for local and overseas organizers (APFO offices)

## APPENDIX III

### SEMINAR PARTICIPANTS

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